



Exemplary findings PEU database



Party family of Commissioners (by individual Commissioner)

Politicization of the EU has become an important research topic. This graph shows the composition of the particular Commissions regarding their Commissioners’ party affiliation. Assignment is based on which group in the EP the Commissioner’s party in question belonged to at the time (party family groupings build on and further develop Hix and Lord 1997). The graph allows making statements about the relative ideological heterogeneity as well as possible ideological or partisan biases of the various Commissions. This is particularly relevant where we abstain from considering the European Commission a neutral administration. Here, one important insight is that the current College of Commissioners is ideologically more heterogenous than any of its predecessors.




Technocratism and Power index

Indices and assessments of politicization of administrations differ substantially. With this Graph we opt for a view that combines a power and a legitimacy logic of politicization. In a first step, Commissioners were assigned to former professional groups (where a person had occupied more than one professional groups, he or she was assigned the category, where the personal had occupied the hierarchically highest post). In a second step, we built two indices of politicization.

Our first index measures political power through portfolio salience. We draw on work by Druckman et al. (2005; 2008) as well as Döring (2007) who assigned numerical values based on expert surveys in 29 European parliamentary democracies. We added new scores for a number of positions that had not been considered in existing works and then took the average value of each position across states to assign a numerical value to each person having served in the Commission. Following this logic, former Prime Ministers have been assigned the highest value (2,27) whereas Activists are the group ranked the lowest (0,22).


Our second index measures political legitimacy and differentiates between ‘political’ and ‘technocratic’ professional backgrounds of persons having served in the Commission. Recurring on Schnapp (2004) we assign a positive value of 1 to ‘political’ positions as those offices which are filled and legitimized by democratic elections, and a ‘0’ to all ‘technocratic’ posts that do not fulfil this criterion.

The graph clearly supports views on the Commission as growing increasingly politicized until the late 1990s, but showing slightly declining levels of politicization since. This finding contrasts with images of the EU as becoming ever more politicized over time and particularly so since the Euro and migration crisis.




Further career of Commissioners by Commission

Turning to the flipside of prior professional background, this graph uses data on the position the respective Commission member occupied after leaving his or her job as Commissioner. Analysing further career paths is not only empirically relevant for clientelistic business-Commission rent-seeking coalitions, but also for the analytical power of a delegation logic reaching into the Commission. The former argument regards economic interests or expertise as driving reintegration into work life after the Commission. Following this reasoning business has an interest to recruit former Commissioners and with them expertise and influence in their area of economic activity. From the later argument, state governments can hope to call on their Commissioner’s loyalty through the options of reappointment or the offer of high-profile domestic positions after having served in the Commission. The graph shows, that across different further career options, Commissioners are most likely to return into politics – either into political positions at the national level or into the European Parliament. However, revolving doors into business are also frequent, raising moral questions that reach beyond cooling off periods and transparency rules.



Development of Commission Directorates (in DGs)

The services of the EU Commission are often treated as monolithic and static. This graph displays the development of Commission DGs according to the number of Directorates they comprised during the respective Commissions. It thus provides sectorally specific information on the EU Commission as an evolving organization. We chose to focus on a small number of DGs to illustrate the changes in the number of Directorates. The observed changes point at three different, potentially relevant explanations. First, increasing numbers of Directorates might reflect the rise in prominence of a policy area. In the EU context this is often related to an expansion of supranational policy making. The ‘greening’ of European policies could thus be linked to an expansion of DG ENV or respectively growing community competences in economics and finance to increasing numbers of Directorates in DG ECFIN. Secondly, portfolios with a strong territorial dimension such as DG AGRI or DG REGIO experience task extension with every round of EU enlargements. This is likely to mirror in organizational differentiation and Directorate growth—a trend that has come to have been curbed more recently. Finally, administrative changes oscillating between high and low numbers of Directorates (e.g. DG HR or DG BUDG) may reflect that horizontal services are at times provided ‘in-house’ and at other times centrally by a separate service (Bauer, 2008), reducing Directorates in the central service in the former case, while pushing the number of directorates up in the latter case.



Historical distribution of portfolios in the European Commission

This graph is devoted to the development of the Commission’s organizational structure over time. It reveals the EU Commission as an evolving organization in at least two regards. First, new areas of activity have continuously been added since the founding days. This partly reflects increasing competence transfers to the supranational level but also demand for more portfolios with enlargement rounds that increased the number of Commissioners seeking to head ‘their own house’. In addition, this may reflect administrative changes, a new President’s political priorities or functional differentiation and policy developments. Second, boundaries between portfolios are far from stable. Most ‘new’ areas belonged to established portfolios before they became independent services. In this case quiet often units dealing with similar issues are taken from different DGs and merged into a new portfolio. An example in the graph is the formation of DG III on the Internal Market and Industrial Affairs in the Jenkins Commission that incorporated not only units but even entire Directorates previously located in the neighbouring DGs ‘Industrial and Technological Affairs’, ‘Internal Market’ and DG Relex, which at the time was responsible for external trade, or the new DG ‘Defence Industry and Space’ that grew out of the DG ‘Enterprise’. In other cases units have been going back and forth between two DGs, depending i.a. on the relative strength of the Commissioners or their respective national governments negotiating the portfolio allocation at the beginning of a new Commission term. Examples are the interfaces of DG ENTR with DG MARKT when it comes to issues of industrial affairs or with DG TRADE on trade issues. At times, all three portfolios had even been handled in one joint DG as was the case during the Thorn and Jenkins Presidencies, when DG III on ‘Internal Market and Industrial Affairs’ was the all-embracing Commission entity for market, enterprise and trade issues. In particular in the aftermath of the Santer crisis the Commission’s reorganisation under Kinnock has entailed a shift in the portfolio structure.